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An Integrated Approach to Prevent Address
Spoofing in IPv6 Links
Alberto Garcı´a-Martı´nez and Marcelo Bagnulo
Abstract—We propose an integrated approach to protect from
address spoofing for both IPv6 and Layer-2 addresses, and
from address resolution attacks. The proposed approach is an
extension to the FCFS SAVI specification, and relies on the
inspection and generation of standard Neighbor Solicitation
messages. It does not require host modification and manual
configuration is only needed to indicate the ports to which routers
connect.
Index Terms—Network-layer security, link-layer security, ad-
dress spoofing, address configuration, IPv6.
I. INTRODUCTION
CRITICAL security threats arise from the ability ofmalicious nodes to use layer-2 identities (e.g., MAC
addresses in Ethernet) or layer-3 identities (IP addresses)
belonging to other nodes of the link. In the particular case
of Ethernet and IPv6, the major threats resulting from layer-2
and layer-3 identity manipulation are the following:
T1. A malicious node M sends packets with IPT as IP
source address. Victim V receives these packets and assumes
incorrectly that the packets have been generated by the rightful
owner of IPT .
T2. M uses the address resolution protocol of IPv6, Neigh-
bor Discovery (ND, [1]), to make V believe that M’s MAC
corresponds to IPT . When V sends traffic to IPT , it is actually
sending it to M. When combined with threat T1, this is a
masquerade attack in which M appears to V as node T.
T3. A variation of T2 is to use ND to make node V believe
that other MAC than M and T is the MAC address of node
T. This prevents communication between V and T, so it is a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
T4. M initiates a communication with T with its own
address, and then uses ND to associate in T the MAC address
of a victim V to IPM . Then the traffic sent by T to IPM is
deflected to V. If the traffic generated is high, this is a flooding
attack.
T5. M prevents other nodes from configuring their IPv6 ad-
dresses by responding to Duplicate Address Detection (DAD,
[2]) requests. This is a DoS attack.
T6. M sends frames with MACV source address, being
MACV the MAC address of node V. 802.1D bridges use
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this frame to update their forwarding information for MACV .
Future frames destined to MACV received by any of these
bridges are sent to M. This is a MAC spoofing attack.
The basic approach to secure link communications is to
configure layer-3 aware bridges with the layer-2 and layer-3
addresses associated to the nodes connecting to each physical
port. ND inspection and filtering according to this configura-
tion protect from the threats related with address resolution,
and also protect against attacks to address configuration. While
this approach solves all the security issues mentioned before,
it results in costly per-device configuration, since it requires
access to the end nodes to obtain their MAC address and con-
figure/obtain their IP address, it requires per-port configuration
in the switches, and it complicates the support for nodes that
change their attachment port.
A more flexible approach results from the use of IEEE
802.1X [3]. IEEE 802.1X allows a node to exchange au-
thentication information with the bridge to which it attaches.
The authentication information can be in user/password form,
certificate, etc. This information is used to coarsely authorize
the node to communicate, so it is not designed to authorize
or negotiate the layer-2 or layer-3 addresses to be used by the
node. However, the bridge can obtain address authorization
from this authentication information either according to a
mapping locally stored in the bridge, or by using RADIUS
or DIAMETER to access to an AAA server. When an AAA
server is used, the bridges can update the filtering information
as a node changes its attachment point to the link. Note that
MAC spoofing can only be prevented if the link administrator
knows in advance the MAC address of each node and config-
ures the AAA server accordingly.
SAVI is a new standard that provides link-scope layer-3
antispoofing protection. A SAVI device, typically a bridge,
associates IP addresses to physical ports and filters out any
packet with a source IP address that does not correspond
to an existing binding. To create this binding, SAVI devices
inspect the IP address configuration messages exchanged by
the nodes. Different solutions of SAVI for DHCP [4], IPv6
locally configured addresses (FCFS, First-Come First-Served
SAVI [5]) and IPv6 nodes using SEND [6], have been defined.
The configuration required is limited to the specification of
the ports through which routers are connected. In addition,
SAVI solutions support layer-2 node mobility. However, SAVI
protection is restricted to threats T1 and T5, providing no
security for ND manipulation (unless the SEND security
extension is used, which requires specific support in the hosts)
and MAC address spoofing.
In this letter we extend FCFS SAVI to provide protection
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to all the threats described without requiring any per host
configuration, greatly reducing the costs of securing the link
compared with existing solutions.
II. FCFS SAVI
FCFS SAVI [5] defines a mechanism to prevent the use of
IPv6 addresses by unauthorized hosts. It does so by creating
bindings between IPv6 addresses and the bridge port that
the rightful owner of the IPv6 address is attached to. The
mechanism is based on information obtained from the DAD
process [2]. DAD operation proceeds as follows: every IPv6
node configuring an address is required to issue a Neighbor
Solicitation (hereafter DAD NS) message with the Solicited
Node multicast destination address, to which any other node
with the same last 24 bits in its address must be associated.
If a node with the same IP address exists, it receives the
DAD NS message and responds with a Neighbor Advertise-
ment (DAD NA) message, so that the node initiating the DAD
procedure must stop configuring the address. If no response
is obtained in a short period of time, the address is deemed
available and the node configures it.
FCFS SAVI main behavior is as follows: when a SAVI
device B receives a DAD NS message for IPv6 address IPA
from a validating port P, i.e., a port which does not connect
to another bridge, it forwards the DAD NS message to any
port of B with a pre-existing binding to IPA (if any), and to
the rest of the bridges. A SAVI binding for IPA is created
in tentative state. Other bridges receiving the DAD NS do the
same, so the message is propagated through the spanning tree,
and forwarded to any port for which a binding for address IPA
exists (if any). If there is no host in the link with address IPA
configured and an existing SAVI binding in its closest SAVI
bridge, then no response is received at bridge B, a timer at B
expires and the binding between IPA and port P is set to valid.
Otherwise, the host configured with address IPA responds
with a DAD NA message. B receives the DAD NA message,
discards the SAVI binding and forwards the message through
P to prevent the node initiating the procedure from configuring
address IPA.
III. FCFS SAVI WITH LAYER-2 EXTENSIONS
The inspection by SAVI devices of the DAD message
exchange is a valid foundation for assuring that only one node
is allowed to use an IP address at a given time, in particular
the first node which tried to configure the IP address when it
was unused. This is a ‘First-Come, First-Served’ behavior, as
stated in the name of the mechanism.
We propose extending FCFS SAVI to prevent MAC address
duplication as follows: FCFS SAVI bridges are modified
to include the MAC address in the data structure storing
SAVI information, the SAVI binding database. Therefore, an
IP/MAC address pair is associated to a physical port. Only
packets coming from a physical port with both the IP and the
MAC address included in an existing binding are forwarded.
When a node N starts configuring its IP address, it sends
a DAD NS for IPN , using MACN as MAC source address.
The SAVI bridge B1 receives the message through PORTP
and creates an entry for [IPN ,MACN , PORTP ] in tentative
state. Then, the following occurs:
• If B1 already has an entry associated to a different port
PORTQ containing IPN , i.e., [IPN ,MACN , PORTQ], it
forwards the DAD NS through PORTQ, as specified by
FCFS SAVI. If the node at this port has IPN config-
ured, it responds with a DAD NA. Then, B1 removes
the [IPN ,MACN , PORTP ] binding and forwards the
DAD NA to node N, aborting IP address configuration
at node N.
• Else, if B1 has an entry [IPB ,MACN , PORTQ] (note that
IPB is different than IPN because otherwise we would be
in the previous case), the switch B1 issues a NS to resolve
the IP address for IPB through PORTQ. This is to check
that the node with MACN is still at its previous location,
PORTQ. If B1 receives a NA responding to the NS,
including MACN as the link-layer address, B1 removes
the binding in tentative state for [IPN ,MACN , PORTP ].
B1 also generates a DAD NA, and sends it to node N
to prevent the configuration of address IPN . Then, node
N is not allowed to communicate using neither IPN nor
MACN .
As occurs with FCFS SAVI, to check for nodes connected in
other bridges having either IPN or MACN , B1 propagates the
DAD NS message to other bridges. These bridges do the same
as if they had received the packet through a validating port,
propagating DAD NS and/or NS. According to the responses,
they propagate to B1 any DAD NA received from the nodes
or generate it when NA messages are received.
B1 configures the binding if a timer expires and it has not
received a response indicating that either the MAC or the IP
address is configured in other port.
Probing the port for which an IP or a MAC was configured
provides support for node mobility: if a node changes its
attachment point, the DAD NS (or NS) is propagated to the
port to which the node attached before, but no response is
generated, so the node is allowed to communicate in its new
location.
To protect from address resolution attacks, each SAVI de-
vice checks that NS and NA messages coming from validating
ports and containing link-layer addresses are consistent with
the binding created for the port. Any ND message not fulfilling
this condition is discarded.
A SAVI bridge may receive a data packet from a validating
port for which a DAD NS has not been received, because the
DAD NS was lost or the node changed its attachment point
without issuing a DAD NS message. In this case, the bridge
itself creates a DAD NS message and continues operation as
described above, in a similar way to the operation described
in the FCFS SAVI standard.
To illustrate the protection provided, consider a node M
attached to bridge B2 which aims to impersonate node N’s
MACN (figure 1). To do so, M sends a data packet with
MACN , but with IPM , an IP address for which a valid binding
exists in B2 for the port through which it is recived, port
3. Then, B2 creates a binding for [IPM ,MACN , port#3] in
tentative state, and generates a DAD NS message requesting
for nodes having either IPM or MACN configured. This
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message is propagated to B1. B1 determines that IPM is not
included in any of its bindings, but MACN is. Then, B1
generates a NS message for IPN to request the MAC address
associated to it, that is sent through the port for which a
binding to [IPM ,MACN ] existed. Node N responds with a NA
message including MACN . Then B1 generates a DAD NA
message for IPM which is propagated through the bridges
without validation, since this domain is considered the trusted
infrastructure. B2 interprets this message as an indication to
remove the binding for [IPM ,MACN , port#3]. In this case
B2 does not propagate the DAD NA message to node M, since
M sent a data packet instead of a DAD NS message.
IV. CONCLUSION
FCFS SAVI with layer-2 extensions provides protection for
IP and MAC spoofing attacks, as well as for address resolution
attacks. In particular, it prevents all listed (T1 to T6) attacks.
The mechanism does not require any host modification, so it
can be easily deployed. In addition, it does not require any
kind of per-node configuration.
The mechanism can be successfully combined with DHCP
SAVI. When DHCP SAVI for IPv6 is used, nodes still use
DAD NS to configure their address. DAD NS messages for
addresses allowed by DHCP are used to check that there are
no duplicated MACs. Communication is only allowed if the
MAC used is unique. In the IPv4 case, SAVI switches generate
ARP requests to perform this test.
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Fig. 1. Example of the protection provided by the extensions to FCFS SAVI
